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Evidence presented in this brief suggests that households 
gaining private health insurance under the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) are significantly 
less likely to fall behind on rent and mortgage payments 
than are those that remain uninsured. This finding is 
based on an analysis of administrative tax data from 
roughly 5,000 low- and moderate-income (LMI) tax filers 
living in states that did not expand Medicaid. We believe 
this study to be the first quasi-experimental analysis 
linking the new ACA insurance exchanges to household 
finances.
Proponents of the ACA had hoped that the law would, 
among other things, make insurance more affordable 
for households lacking access to coverage through their 
employers. Expanded insurance access was expected to 
reduce the share of households that experience financial 
devastation following a serious medical diagnosis.1 Yet, 
despite enormous political interest in the ACA, empirical 
research that documents the act’s effects on financial 
outcomes is just beginning to emerge.2 Moreover, 
research in this area has focused primarily on Medicaid 
expansions rather than on the private insurance market. 
This brief presents results from preliminary analyses on 
a large and representative sample of LMI households. 
The analyses seek to address this gap.3 The research 
is part of a broader research agenda assessing the 
relationship between the ACA and the financial security 
of LMI households. The brief first provides an overview of 
the insurance landscape of LMI households following the 
implementation of the ACA. Then, it presents results from 
a quasi-experimental analysis, which identifies a plausible 
causal link between expanded access to private insurance 
and improved household financial well-being for people 
living near the federal poverty line (FPL).
Consistent with research on Medicaid expansions, our 
data signal that medical bills from an unexpected 
health event consume fewer of the resources of people 
with coverage. In turn, a higher level of liquid assets 
is associated with the lower rate at which households 
become delinquent on housing payments. Surprisingly, 
we also find that the majority of uninsured LMI filers 
would qualify for Medicaid or subsidized coverage but 
do not receive it. Put together, our findings spotlight a 
substantial opportunity to improve the financial stability 
of LMI households through assisted enrollment in the 
ACA’s health insurance programs.
Background: The ACA and 
the Medicaid Coverage Gap
An important goal of the ACA is to reduce the share of 
uninsured Americans by increasing access to quality 
health-insurance coverage. Two key aspects of the law—
the expansion of Medicaid and the provision of subsidies 
to purchase private insurance—specifically target the LMI 
population.4
Prior to passage of the ACA, Medicaid was primarily a 
program for children, pregnant women, older adults, and 
the disabled living in LMI households. States typically 
did not offer Medicaid to childless adults and offered it 
only to parents with incomes that were well below the 
poverty line.
With the ACA’s passage, Medicaid’s focus broadened to 
include able-bodied LMI adults. Through large federal 
subsidies, the ACA encourages states to expand Medicaid 
to the adult population earning up to 138% of the FPL. As 
of 2016, 31 states (and Washington, DC) had expanded 
Medicaid and 19 states had not. In states that expanded 
Medicaid, adults earning up to 138% of the FPL qualify 
for Medicaid; those earning between 138% and 400% of 
the FPL are eligible for financial assistance in purchasing 
qualified private insurance.5
The ACA also codified the construction of a private 
insurance Marketplace, sometimes called the 
2“Marketplace” or the “Exchange,” where people who 
earn too much to qualify for Medicaid can purchase 
quality health insurance directly from private insurance 
companies. To encourage diverse enrollment (particularly 
from young and healthy people) and to provide an 
affordable insurance option for LMI households lacking 
access to employer-sponsored coverage, the federal 
government heavily subsidizes the out-of-pocket costs 
and premiums of LMI participants.
In particular, participants with incomes between 
100% and 250% of the FPL qualify for “cost-sharing 
reductions.”6 These are subsidies that reduce out-of-
pocket costs, such as from deductibles and copayments, 
paid when health care services are used. According to 
the Kaiser Family Foundation’s calculator, cost-sharing 
reductions would reduce the out-of-pocket maximum 
from $6,850 to $2,250, on average, for a 30-year-old 
single adult earning just over 100% of the FPL in 2016 
(or about $12,000).7 The federal government pays these 
subsidies directly to the insurer, and the enrollee does 
not have to refund the subsidy if his/her projected 
income at the time of enrollment differs from actual 
income at the end of the year. 
The ACA also subsidizes the insurance premiums of 
participants with incomes between 100% and 400% of 
the FPL.8 Premium subsidies, which the Internal Revenue 
Service usually pays in advance to insurers, reduce the 
monthly premium owed by the participant. Premium 
subsidies are often referred to as “tax credits,” since 
they must be reconciled for any difference between 
projected income at the time of enrollment and actual 
income on tax forms filed the following year.
Premium subsidies decline as income rises. According 
to the Kaiser Family Foundation,9 a 30-year-old single 
adult earning just over 100% of the FPL would have paid 
an average monthly premium of $20 ($244 per year) 
after subsidies in 2016. Without the subsidies, that same 
participant would have paid about $265 per month for 
the same plan ($3,186 per year). That equates to 27% of 
the participant’s annual income.
Because Medicaid eligibility thresholds for adults 
remain so low in states that did not expand Medicaid, 
a substantial share of LMI households are in what 
is commonly called the “coverage gap.” As visually 
represented in Figure 1, the coverage gap includes adults 
who earn too much to qualify for Medicaid but too little 
to qualify for Marketplace insurance subsidies, which 
begin at 100% of the FPL. Since the ACA was originally 
designed under the assumption that states would expand 
Medicaid to people earning up to 138% of the FPL, some 
households were left in insurance limbo when states 
chose not to expand Medicaid. Health insurance is 
usually unaffordable for people in the coverage gap.10 
Adults in the coverage gap who are unable to obtain 
insurance through an employer or a family member often 
go uninsured or purchase “catastrophic” (low-premium, 
high-deductible) plans. The Kaiser Family Foundation 
estimates that 2.6 million Americans are living in the 
coverage gap.11
Sample
Analyses presented in this brief use the tax records and 
survey responses of a large sample of LMI households 
over the 3-year period (2014–2016) following Medicaid 
expansion and the opening of the health insurance 
Marketplace. Data come from the Refund to Savings 
Initiative, an ongoing partnership among Washington 
University in St. Louis, Duke University, and Intuit, Inc.12 
Tax data come from filers who use TurboTax Freedom 
Edition online tax-preparation software to prepare 
their tax returns and who consent to the use of their 
anonymized data for research. In the period covered by 
the brief, the software was offered for free to tax filers 
who had adjusted gross income of less than $31,000, who 
qualified for the Earned Income Tax Credit, and/or who 
were active-duty members of the military with adjusted 
gross income of less than $62,000.13
The analyses in this brief are based on precise 
income data from Intuit’s TurboTax Freedom Edition 
administrative tax records for the 2014, 2015, and 2016 
tax seasons and from the Household Financial Survey 
for those years. Immediately following the tax-filing 
process, participants were invited to complete the 
survey and were offered small financial incentives for 
completion. The Household Financial Survey includes a 
wide array of questions about filers’ assets, liabilities, 
financial behaviors, use of social services, experiences of 
hardship, and health insurance status. The survey is not a 
longitudinal instrument that captures data from the same 
respondents in each survey (though some tax filers may 
take the survey in multiple years), but the compositions 
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Figure 1. Who qualifies for Medicaid and Marketplace subsidies? 
States that did not expand Medicaid have different thresholds for parents. 
This figure shows the average threshold for parents in 2016 for states 
that did not expand Medicaid (45% of the federal poverty line), calculated 
using data from the Kaiser Family Foundation.
3of the samples are similar across survey years. The 
analytic sample includes 7,605 participants from the 
2014 tax season, 19,825 from the 2015 tax season, and 
19,887 from the 2016 tax season. The sample consists of 
participants who were U.S. citizens aged 19 to 64 at the 
time of data collection and for whom both administrative 
and survey data are available.14
Access to administrative tax data greatly facilitates an 
analysis of the ACA, since eligibility for Medicaid and 
Marketplace subsidies is based entirely on a household’s 
modified adjusted gross income. We merge individual-
level tax data with corresponding federal poverty 
guidelines and Kaiser Family Foundation data detailing 
the Medicaid thresholds for parents and childless adults 
in each state and for each year. From this combined 
information, we generate a precise measure of an 
individual’s position relative to the FPL and eligibility 
status for health care programs.
Since these data come from a survey of online tax filers, 
the sample distribution skews toward younger adults. 
However, we correct for this skew using sampling weights 
and, when applicable, demographic controls. Sampling 
weights based on the demographic characteristics of 
the American Community Survey sample are applied 
wherever statistics are intended to be representative of 
the national LMI population between the ages of 19 and 
64.15 Using regression analysis (not shown), we confirm 
that all findings summarized in this brief are robust to the 
inclusion of controls for income, age, race, number of 
dependents, college completion, gender, marital status, 
employment status, and student status.
Our data set has a few drawbacks. First, there could 
be a degree of misreporting, particularly for certain 
variables. For example, some participants might not 
know the type of health insurance they have and so may 
report that they have private insurance but actually are 
covered by employer-sponsored insurance. Other self-
reported variables, such as a household’s total medical 
expenditure, are continuous and therefore subject 
to greater measurement error than are categorical 
variables. Nonetheless, our concerns about measurement 
error are attenuated by the high degree of correlation 
among variables that are reported on both the survey 
and the tax form. Certain survey questions may lend 
themselves to multiple interpretations, however.16 For 
example, we measure the prevalence of a recent medical 
shock using a positive response to a fairly subjective 
question: “In the last 6 months, have you or has any 
member of your household (the people on your tax form) 
had an unexpected major out-of-pocket medical expense 
(e.g., from hospitalization or emergency room visit)?” 
Fortunately, we expect our key outcome variable (rent/
mortgage hardship) to be fairly precisely measured, 
since it is binary and generated from a straightforward 
question: “Was there a time in the past 6 months when 
you or someone in your household did not pay the full 
amount of the rent or mortgage because you could not 
afford it?”17 Second, there is a gap of 2 to 4 months in the 
data set between the point when income was measured 
(at the end of the prior year) and when insurance status 
was reported (at tax time of the current year). Incomes 
may have changed for some participants during this 
gap. Finally, as is often the case with survey data, there 
might be an unknown degree of nonresponse bias. If it 
is present, it could affect both the types of participants 
who respond to the survey and the questions to which 
they elect to respond.
Insurance After ACA Implementation
Medicaid expansion and subsidized Marketplace 
insurance have produced a sharp drop in the portion of 
LMI households that are uninsured. Estimates from our 
weighted sample show a decline in the rate of uninsured 
LMI households since early in 2014, the year in which the 
ACA Marketplaces opened: The rate dropped from 33% 
in 2014 to 17% in 2016 (Table 1). Much of the reduction 
stems from growth in the portion of LMI households 
enrolled in Medicaid, up 11 percentage points over the 
2014–2016 period. This shift represents a doubling in the 
proportion of LMI households covered by Medicaid.
As expected, however, Medicaid growth has been uneven 
Table 1. The Share of LMI Households That Are Uninsured Has Fallen 
Dramatically Since 2014
Insurance status 2014 2015 2016
Employer 27 27 28
Family and student 14 18 15
VA, Medicare, and other 10 9 9
Marketplace 5 8 9
Medicaid 11 19 22
Uninsured 33 19 17
Total 100 100 100
Note. LMI = low- and moderate-income; VA = Department of Veterans 
Affairs. Sampling weights are used (n = 47,317). The table presents 
the percentage of low- and moderate-income households by insurance 
status and year.
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Figure 2. Growth in Medicaid coverage is owed to expansion states. 
The figure shows the percentage of low- and moderate-income households 
with Medicaid coverage, by state expansion status and year. Sampling 
weights are used (n = 47,317).
4across states. This trend is documented in Figure 2, which 
presents results from our weighted sample: 34% of LMI 
households in states that have expanded Medicaid were 
covered by it in 2016, up from 20% in 2014 (the year 
when most expansion states first expanded Medicaid). By 
comparison, just 11% of LMI households in nonexpansion 
states were covered in 2016, and that is about the same 
proportion covered in 2014 (9%).
In 2016, about 33% of uninsured respondents lived 
in the coverage gap between eligibility for Medicaid 
and eligibility for subsidized coverage through the 
Marketplace (Table 2).18 These respondents are uninsured 
tax filers who have incomes below 100% of the FPL and 
who live in one of the 19 states that did not expand 
Medicaid to cover people making at least 100% of the 
FPL. If these states expand Medicaid in the future, all 
adults earning up to 138% of the FPL would be eligible. 
Therefore, about 40% of uninsured respondents would 
have qualified for Medicaid had all states fully expanded.
Importantly, statistics in Table 3 suggest that the 
majority (60%) of the uninsured LMI households in our 
sample currently qualify for either Medicaid or subsidized 
Marketplace insurance in each of the states where they 
live. In particular, as of 2016, 34% of uninsured filers 
qualified for Medicaid, and 26% qualified for Marketplace 
subsidies. Given the terms of access to TurboTax Freedom 
Edition software, participation in our survey is largely 
restricted to filers in households with incomes below 
$31,000, and the vast majority of our respondents 
have incomes below 250% of the FPL. This means that 
participants would have qualified for those Marketplace 
plans with relatively generous subsidy schedules. These 
statistics indicate that, if our sample is representative 
of the uninsured LMI population, a substantial portion of 
uninsured LMI households in the United States were not 
uninsured because of cost burdens alone.19, 20 Instead, 
many could lack the motivation or inertia needed to 
sign up or be unaware of the existence of Medicaid or 
federal subsidies for Marketplace insurance, of the cost 
of insurance through these programs, and/or of their 
eligibility status.21
Our analysis suggests that nearly all LMI households in 
our sample could be insured by closing the coverage gap 
in states that did not expand Medicaid as well as the 
gaps in inertia and awareness—gaps evident in all states. 
Measuring the prevalence and causes of uninsurance in the 
LMI population since ACA implementation is particularly 
important given the growing evidence, presented in the 
next section, that health insurance coverage offers some 
protection against financial distress.
The Effect of Marketplace Coverage 
on Housing Instability
To what extent does health insurance coverage affect 
financial outcomes? Although seemingly simple, this 
question is surprisingly difficult to answer. A simple 
comparison of the financial outcomes of people who have 
insurance with those of people who lack coverage is not 
particularly informative in situations where the same 
factors that affect a household’s financial well-being also 
affect a household’s health insurance status. For example, 
unobservable characteristics like a person’s ability to plan 
for the future might also drive those with good budgeting 
habits to purchase insurance. If that’s so, the savings 
behaviors of insured households would be better than 
those of uninsured counterparts. However, it would be 
inappropriate to attribute this difference to insurance 
status rather than to planning and budgeting habits.
In recent work, researchers have used experimental 
and quasi-experimental designs to tackle this causality 
problem. In those studies, people are randomly 
assigned to receive health insurance, and assignment 
is based on factors that are not correlated with their 
financial outcomes. Finkelstein et al. use data from a 
Medicaid lottery offered to low-income adults in Oregon 
in 2008.22 Results from this randomized, controlled 
experiment suggest that Medicaid access lowers out-
of-pocket medical spending and reduces the number 
of medical bills sent to collection. Changes in certain 
states’ thresholds for Medicaid eligibility have enabled 
other quasi-experimental studies, which indicate that 
increased eligibility is associated with declines in rates 
of bankruptcy, the incidence of unpaid bills, and the 
amount of debt sent to third-party collection agencies.23 
Similarly, Barcellos and Jacobson observe a decline in the 
reported difficulty of paying bills at age 65, the threshold 
at which one qualifies for Medicare.24
Although there are many ways of measuring financial 
distress, we focus on self-reported difficulties in making 
rent or mortgage payments on time. The immediate 
Table 2. A Third of Uninsured Respondents Live in the Coverage 
Gap (n = 7,366)
The percentage of uninsured respondents that… 2014 2015 2016
Are currently living in the coverage gapa 33 32 33
Would qualify for Medicaid if their state expanded 
Medicaid 49 46 40
Note. Sampling weights are not used.
aThe coverage gap refers to the income levels that are greater than 
the eligibility ceiling for Medicaid but less than the eligibility floor for 
subsidized Marketplace insurance.
Table 3. The Majority of Uninsured Respondents Currently Qualify 
for Low-Cost Insurance (n = 7,366)
The percentage of uninsured respondents that… 2014 2015 2016
Currently qualify for Medicaid 24 25 34
Currently qualify for subsidized Marketplace insurance 33 30 26
Total 57 54 60
Note. Sampling weights are not used.
5financial benefits of health insurance come mainly in the 
form of protection against catastrophic medical expenses.25 
Although a family might be able to endure mild illness 
without insurance, a chronic problem like diabetes or a 
severe disease like cancer could quickly exhaust the savings 
and other resources of an uninsured household. Facing a 
high-cost medical shock without insurance may force a 
household to skip essential payments like those for rent or 
a mortgage, though doing so can lead to homelessness. We 
contend that financial distress is likely to be most visible 
in missed housing payments as opposed to other, lighter, 
and more common indicators of liquidity problems such 
as missing a utility bill or credit card payment.26 Simply 
put, our expectation is that increased access to health 
insurance coverage will manifest in a reduced propensity to 
be delinquent on essential housing payments.
In a sense, rent/mortgage hardship for the LMI population 
is analogous to bankruptcy for a wealthier population 
in that both problems are indicative of a household 
experiencing extreme illiquidity. As such, this analysis 
may be thought of as an extension of other work looking 
at the relationship between health insurance and 
bankruptcy in the general population, including non-LMI 
households. Indeed, bankruptcy is extremely rare among 
LMI households (affecting just 1% of our sample in a 
given year). This is likely due to bankruptcy’s legal cost, 
restrictions on repeat occurrence, and the implications 
for future credit access.27
By contrast, as is documented in Figure 3, rent/mortgage 
hardship appears to be fairly common among LMI 
households in our sample. It also appears to be correlated 
with health insurance coverage: 16% of insured respondents 
and 26% of uninsured ones report rent/mortgage hardship. 
The magnitude of these differences expands if we 
condition the analysis on those who experienced a 
medical shock, with the prevalence of that hardship 
rising 10 percentage points for insured respondents 
and 14 percentage points for uninsured ones.28 These 
simple statistics are purely suggestive, however, and are 
not intended to document the causal impact of health 
insurance on financial well-being.
If we instead compare otherwise similar households that 
differ only in their eligibility for subsidized Marketplace 
insurance, we can get closer to a causal interpretation. 
As part of our quasi-experimental design, we exploit the 
fact that some states did not expand Medicaid. Because 
of the coverage gap in these states and the threshold for 
accessing Marketplace subsidies, insurance is dramatically 
more affordable for households with income above 100% 
of the FPL. We therefore expect that the likelihood of 
enrolling in coverage is higher among households with 
income above that threshold than among households 
with incomes that are lower but too high for Medicaid 
eligibility. Hence, the subsidy threshold offers a source 
of variation in insurance coverage that is not correlated 
with individual’s unobservable characteristics or current 
financial conditions.
Figure 4 summarizes coverage trends in 2015 and 2016 for 
tax filers who have incomes in the range of 0% to 200% of 
the FPL. Of these filers, 4,973 of live in states that did not 
expand Medicaid and 9,018 live in states that expanded 
Medicaid.29 Dots represent the mean of the y-axis variable 
within small bins (ranges) of income (the x-axis variable). 
Figure 4 plots the average share of respondents reporting 
private insurance coverage within each bin of income.
Figure 4 shows that, consistent with our expectations, 
sample participants living just above the poverty line 
in states that did not expand Medicaid are about 10 
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Figure 3. Rent and mortgage hardship appears linked to health insurance 
coverage. Percentage of respondents that became delinquent on a rent or 
mortgage payment in the last 6 months. Sample not weighted (n = 31,604). 
Sample includes 2015 and 2016 respondents with incomes between 0 and 
200% of the federal poverty line. Sample excludes respondents with access to 
alternative forms of insurance, such as through an employer.
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Figure 4. The start of subsidies generates a jump in Marketplace 
coverage in nonexpansion states. Share of respondents with private 
insurance coverage. Sample not weighted. Sample includes 2015 and 
2016 respondents with incomes between 0 and 200% of the federal 
poverty line (FPL). Sample excludes respondents with access to alternative 
forms of insurance such as through an employer. Dots represent the 
averages for the observations within each of 15 bins of income on each 
side of the subsidy threshold (100% FPL).
6percentage points more likely to obtain private insurance 
than are sample participants living just below the 
poverty line. Furthermore, the same demarcation in the 
prevalence of private insurance coverage is not observed 
among respondents residing in states that expanded 
Medicaid to adults earning up to 138% of the FPL.30 In 
other words, Marketplace coverage is discontinuous in 
nonexpansion states among households with income 
around 100% of the FPL, the threshold at which federal 
subsidies come into play.
If health insurance coverage affects financial outcomes, 
discontinuity in coverage should translate into a 
discontinuity in the prevalence of rent/mortgage hardship 
at the subsidy threshold. As shown in Figure 5(a), the 
share of participants who fell behind on mortgage or 
rent payments declines by about 4 percentage points at 
the subsidy threshold.31 This decline equates to a 15% 
reduction relative to the average prevalence of delinquent 
housing payments to the left of the threshold (27%).
If, as we suspect, the mechanism driving reduced rent/
mortgage hardship is reduced illiquidity caused by 
medical bills, then medical bill illiquidity should also 
be discontinuous. We measure medical bill illiquidity as 
the ratio of a household’s medical spending to its liquid 
assets.32 Figure 6(a) illustrates medical bill illiquidity 
among a subsample conditioned on reported experience of 
a recent medical shock (i.e., a shock occurring within the 
previous 6 months). We observe a decline of approximately 
20% at the threshold in the logged value of this ratio. These 
observations are consistent with what we would expect 
to find if insurance reduced the degree of financial strain 
generated by large, unexpected medical expenditures.
An easy falsification test is to run these same analyses on 
participants living in states that expanded Medicaid (i.e., 
where there is no discontinuity in insurance coverage 
at 100% of the FPL). As Figures 5(b) and 6(b) document, 
expansion states show none of the same discontinuities 
in financial distress evident in nonexpansion states. 
These findings support the theory that the jump in 
insurance access at the poverty line in nonexpansion 
states is driving improvements in the ability of affected 
households to make home payments.
Discussion
While a number of studies have documented the 
importance of Medicaid coverage in reducing financial 
strain among low income households,33 we believe 
that this is the first study to causally link household 
financial conditions and the Marketplaces established 
under the ACA.
Results based on the administrative tax data and survey 
responses from a large sample of LMI households during 
2015 and 2016 indicate that the rate of delinquency on 
rent or mortgage payments is about 15% lower among 
near-poverty-line households that qualify for Marketplace 
subsidies than among those that do not qualify. A 
delinquent housing payment is a good signal of a 
household facing an extreme liquidity problem—the kind 
of problem that health insurance coverage is most likely 
to measurably affect in the short term.
The expansion of health insurance access has a number 
of direct benefits for LMI populations, which are often 
less healthy than the general population, less likely to 
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Figure 5. A jump in Marketplace coverage is linked to a decline in 
rent/mortgage hardship. Share of respondents reporting delinquent 
housing payments. Sample not weighted (n = 16,128). Sample includes 
2015 and 2016 respondents with incomes between 0 and 200% of the 
federal poverty line (FPL). Sample excludes respondents with access 
to alternative forms of insurance, such as through and employer. Dots 
represent the averages for the observations within each of 11 bins of 
income on each side of the subsidy threshold (100% of the FPL).
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Figure 6. Illiquidity due to medical bills declines at the threshold for 
Marketplace subsidies. Mean of (logged) medical spending over liquid 
assets following a medical shock. Sample not weighted. Sample includes 
2015 and 2016 respondents who have incomes between 25% and 175% 
of the federal poverty line (FPL) and who report experiencing a recent 
unexpected medical expense. Sample excludes respondents with access to 
alternative forms of insurance, such as through an employer. Dots represent 
the averages for the observations within each of nine bins of income on each 
side of the subsidy threshold (100% of the FPL).
7receive treatment, and more exposed to environmental 
and social conditions that can negatively affect their overall 
well-being.34 This research demonstrates, however, that 
the benefits of health insurance extend beyond the direct 
benefits to physical health, manifesting in financial well-
being as well. The chief outcome explored in this study—the 
prevalence of delinquent housing payments—is of particular 
concern to LMI populations. Housing instability is a common 
experience among LMI households.35 Moreover, housing 
instability carries a number of risks beyond loss of shelter. 
It has been linked to negative mental-health outcomes and 
poorer early childhood developmental outcomes.36
This brief presents new evidence that, within just 3 years, 
expanded health insurance access for LMI populations 
through the ACA Marketplaces likely reduced rent/mortgage 
hardship, thereby, potentially lessening the prevalence 
of housing instability and the associated downstream 
outcomes documented by prior researchers. It follows 
that future work should explore the influence of health 
insurance coverage on downstream and longer term 
indicators of financial well-being. For example, it would 
be interesting to know whether improved, preventive 
health-care access leads to higher labor output and to 
college attendance of dependent children.37
This brief has demonstrated the financial benefits of 
insurance, but insufficient take-up of existing low-cost 
health-insurance options is now as much of a challenge as 
is lack of access. Indeed, 60% of uninsured LMI households 
in our survey qualified for low cost insurance, either 
through Medicaid or through subsidized Marketplace 
insurance, in the state where these residents lived in 
2016. Future research should also explore the reasons 
eligible individuals do not to acquire health insurance 
through Medicaid or the subsidized Marketplace.
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level data only with the prior explicit consent of TurboTax 
Freedom Edition customers. Compilations follow Intuit’s 
policies and internal procedures to help ensure the privacy and 
confidentiality of customer tax data.
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2. Fitzgerald, Bias, and Gurley-Calvez (2015); Hu, Kaestner, 
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3. Results presented in this brief summarize findings from a forth-
coming working paper by Gallagher, Gopalan, and Grinstein-
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4. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. 
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see Sec. 2001 at 124 Stat. 271–279. On subsidies for insur-
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slightly to 87% for participants earning between 150% and 200% 
of the FPL (DeLeire, Chappel, Finegold, & Gee, 2016).
9. Kaiser Family Foundation (n.d.).
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(82% of the FPL) and living in a nonexpansion state chooses 
to insure the two children through either the Children’s 
Health Insurance Program or Medicaid and to insure the two 
adults (both 30 years old) through a silver plan purchased on 
the Marketplace, that family could expect to pay the follow-
ing for the silver plan: premiums of $531 per month ($6,371 
per year, or 31.86% of the family’s annual income) and 30% 
of the cost of the adults’ medical services, up to an out-of-
pocket limit of $13,700 (Kaiser Family Foundation, n.d.).
11. Garfield, Damico, Cox, Claxton, and Levitt (2016).
12. The Refund to Savings Initiative assesses the outcomes of 
behavioral economics techniques aimed at encouraging LMI 
tax filers to save all or a part of their expected federal tax 
refunds. This brief uses the same data set to study a differ-
ent set of research questions.
13. Intuit offers the TurboTax Freedom Edition software as part of 
the Internal Revenue Service’s Free File program. For more on 
the Free File program, see: https://www.irs.gov/uac/about 
-the-free-file-program.
14. We assess financial outcomes in the final part of this brief. 
We do this using a research design that requires us to restrict 
the sample to participants who have incomes between 0% and 
200% of the FPL and who live in the 18 states that have not 
expanded Medicaid to adults earning over 100% of the FPL. In 
the pooled 2015–2016 data set, 4,973 participants meet these 
criteria. We exclude 2014 data from this part of the analysis 
because the Marketplaces had just opened at the time of tax 
filing in 2014 and we would not expect the Marketplaces to af-
fect financial outcomes so immediately.
815. Our weighting procedure involves estimating sampling prob-
abilities with a logistic regression on American Community 
Survey data appended onto our sample data. Weights are the 
inverse of the estimated probability of being sampled. Before 
calculating the weights, we restrict the American Community 
Survey data set to participants aged 19 to 64 with annual 
incomes below $35,000, our population of interest. Sampling 
probabilities are based on the same demographic character-
istics (census division, education, gender, race, and age) used 
by the FINRA (Financial Industry Regulatory Authority) Investor 
Education Foundation’s National Financial Capability Study. 
For more on the Financial Capability Study, see http://www 
.usfinancialcapability.org.
16. Participants often round their responses to continuous vari-
ables. They may also misremember or type the wrong value. 
For this reason, we remove aberrant values (e.g., $1 billion) 
and log all continuous variables.
17. For ease of exposition in this brief, a positive response to this 
question is taken to indicate a “delinquent” housing payment 
and an expression of “rent/mortgage hardship.”
18. Tables 2 and 3 do not employ sampling weights. Weights are 
used in Table 1 and Figure 2 in order to make our sample de-
mographically representative of the national LMI adult popula-
tion. In contrast, Tables 2 and 3 are intended to explore only 
a subset of our sample: those respondents who are uninsured 
and live in states with particular program eligibility thresholds.
19. We recognize that affordability is subjective and not all 
LMI households would consider subsidized premiums, even 
those as low as $20 per month, to be affordable. Nonethe-
less, in some cases, subsidized Marketplace insurance costs 
less than insurance available for purchase through an em-
ployer, and take-up rates for employer insurance are high: 
around 73% for households with incomes below 250% of the 
FPL (Blavin, Shartzer, Long, & Holahan, 2015).
20. Our estimate of the share of uninsured LMI adults who are eli-
gible for assistance appears to be similar to estimates produced 
by the Kaiser Family Foundation once those estimates are ad-
justed to match our sample criteria (see Garfield et al., 2016).
21. Several surveys conducted by the Kaiser Family Foundation 
support this hypothesis (see, e.g., Garfield et al., 2016).
22. Finkelstein et al. (2012).
23. Gross and Notowidigdo (2011); Hu et al. (2016).
24. Barcellos and Jacobson (2015).
25. Gross and Notowidigdo (2011); Mazumder and Miller (2016).
26. We find that 57% of sample participants who live in nonexpan-
sion states and have incomes under 100% of the FPL report 
being recently delinquent on regular bills. By comparison, 27% 
report being recently delinquent on housing payments.
27. Gross, Notowidigdo, and Wang (2014); Jagtiani and Li (2014).
28. Regardless of an individual’s insurance status, a major health 
shock, such as a hospitalization, may cause missed work 
hours and, therefore, reduced income, which, in turn, may 
result in rent/mortgage hardship. However, the finding that 
the incidence of rent/mortgage hardship is greater for the 
uninsured following a medical shock suggests that the under-
lying mechanism is not income loss alone; expenditures asso-
ciated with the medical shock may also play a role.
29. We restrict this analysis to include only those participants 
without coverage through an employer, school, or fam-
ily member since people with access to these alternative 
forms of insurance are unlikely to seek (or qualify for) sub-
sidized Marketplace insurance.
30. It is interesting to note that incidence of private insurance 
coverage (Figure 4) is not closer to zero even among house-
holds with incomes that are below subsidy eligibility (less 
than 100% of the FPL in nonexpansion states) or that overlap 
with Medicaid eligibility (less than 138% of the FPL in expan-
sion states). There are several possible explanations. First, 
there could be a degree of misreporting (see the Sample 
section of this brief). Second, people who are under the age 
of 30 and cannot afford private insurance are permitted to 
purchase low-cost “catastrophic” plans (not sold through the 
Marketplace) without paying a penalty under the ACA man-
date. Third, some participants may fall into a loophole per-
mitting people who have projected incomes above 100% of 
the FPL to qualify for Marketplace premium and cost-sharing 
subsidies, which don’t need to be refunded if actual incomes 
later fall below the poverty line. Fourth, some enrollees may 
be in quasi-retirement, having incomes below 100% of the 
FPL but the necessary resources to purchase Marketplace 
insurance. Finally, these participants might be recently un-
employed and covered through COBRA (the common term 
for postemployment coverage provisions in the Consolidated 
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985).
31. In their forthcoming working paper, Gallagher et al. (in 
press) use a fuzzy regression discontinuity approach imple-
mented through a bivariate probit model and find that a 10 
percentage point increase in the probability of private in-
surance coverage reduces the probability of rent/mortgage 
hardship by about 5 percentage points after controlling for 
demographic factors.
32. Medical spending includes all nonreimbursed premiums and 
out-of-pocket costs. Liquid assets include bank account bal-
ances, cash, money market assets, and prepaid card balances.
33. See, e.g., Finkelstein et al. (2012); Gross and Notowidigdo 
(2011); Hu et al. (2016).
34. Morello-Frosch, Zuk, Jerrett, Shamasunder, and Kyle 
(2011); Woolf et al. (2015).
35. Curtis, Corman, Noonan, and Reichman (2014); Kushel, 
Gupta, Gee, and Haas (2006); Phinney, Danziger, Pollack, and 
Seefeldt (2007).
36. Suglia, Duarte, and Sandel (2011); Ziol-Guest and McKenna (2014).
37. Although prior research has found significant downstream 
effects on children from children’s health insurance cover-
age (Cohodes, Grossman, Kleiner, and Lovenheim, 2016; 
Brown, Kowalski, and Lurie, 2015), research is less clear on 
how coverage of adults affects the long-term financial out-
comes of adults and their children.
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